Negotiation is a context sport. It demands attention to multiple motivations, agendas, and preferences. Negotiation across culture complicates context by highlighting the cultural realities of the negotiation dance. Without awareness of appropriate cues to follow and sensitivity to the possibilities for action opening and closing throughout the negotiation process itself, foreigners face little possibility of successful conclusion to negotiation in a cross-cultural setting. This article makes explicit seven principles driving the act of negotiation in a Chinese context. Within the framework of an actual negotiation for delivery of training for Chinese managers, the author describes what these principles look like as they were enacted through Chinese negotiating practices and how he responded to them from both a theoretical and a practical perspective. In the face of Chinese negotiation principles, the article suggests a range of practical strategies for successful-and respectful-negotiation in China.
ness" (Blackman, 1997) . We are told that ritual is important (Seligman, 1999) , that agreements take time (Tung, 1989) , that the Chinese are shrewd (Pye, 1986) , but that through frank discussion and patience, opportunity awaits (Blackman, 2001) . Chinese negotiators additionally have been characterized as cooperative and "win-win" when relationships have been properly established (Adler, Brahm, & Graham, 1992; Deverge, 1986) and honest (March, 1994) . Although conflicting characteristics are equally noted-March himself uses "dishonest" in the same article in which he promotes the Chinese as "honest"-sufficient positive spin is generated that the foreign businessperson could rightfully board the plane with naïve expectations of a warm and easygoing negotiation experience. We as foreigners are generally unprepared for the negotiation that awaits-the second side of the consensus.
When foreigners arrive in China and begin their negotiations, they frequently are confronted with "fierce adversarial bargaining" that appears to lack the politeness and consideration they expected. The high pressure of such bargaining, a process that often is backed with threats and pep talks about the way things are done in China, takes them completely by surprise (Blackman, 1997) . Pye (1982) notes the tendency of the Chinese negotiator to use tactics and ploys not in keeping with the benevolent image suggested by Chuang Tsu.
This article examines key negotiating principles and practices outlined in literature focused on negotiation practice in the People's Republic of China. Through detailed description of negotiation of a contract to deliver management training in a State Owned Enterprise (SOE), the article demonstrates how current negotiation principles and practice reflect past research findings. The review of literature and case analysis suggests a variety of negotiating strategies useful for foreign negotiators for effectively dealing with Chinese negotiation practice while maintaining effective business relationships. Through the dual focus of existing research and current case analysis, the article puts forward the conclusion that little has changed in the Chinese approach to negotiation practices. The case experience suggests that where appropriate, integrating Chinese principles and practices into the foreigner's own approach can prove effective in arriving at successful conclusions to the negotiation process.
METHOD
This article might best be described as a phenomenological examination of Chinese cross-cultural negotiation processes. Through a detailed examination of one particular negotiation lived by the author in his business dealings in China, comparisons are drawn to the experiences of others as detailed in the literature. The approach attempts to enact the spirit of "thick description," a concept proposed by anthropologist Clifford Geertz (1973) by which real-life examples are used to help deepen readers' understanding of a phenomenon through translation of more abstract principles into examples of actual practice as experienced by those embedded in the system. The methodological approach attempts to get behind the elementary experience of a common negotiation to identify elements of its inner structure. The goal is to make that structure more explicit and, through a phenomenological exploration of the negotiation process itself, to identify principles, practices, and responses useful for guiding future negotiations between Chinese and foreign negotiators (see Bentz & Shapiro, 1998 , for discussion and description of a similar approach).
In this case, the methodology involved first capturing the details of a negotiation over the 18-month period during which it was experienced by the author. Analysis resulted in the identification of a number of stages in the negotiation process, determined in part by their positioning in the timeline of events but additionally by the pauses in interaction between each stage. In addition, examination of each stage resulted in the identification of a number of practices central to the dynamics and influential on the final result of the negotiation itself from the perspective of the author, who was the foreign negotiator.
A second component of the methodology involved a review of pertinent literature related to Chinese culture in general and negotiation in mainland China in particular. The review was designed to identify any logically consistent patterns in prior examinations of Chinese negotiation practices and to document such findings for comparison with those identified through analysis of the case study. The final principles and practices selected for inclusion in the discussion and results sections were chosen based on consistency of their identified presence in the literature and their perceived impact on the process of the focal negotiation as identified by the author and his Chinese negotiating colleague.
Review of the literature resulted in a preliminary listing of traditional negotiating practices (Table 1) . The subsequent analysis and discussion within the context of the case negotiation resulted in identification of seven principles and associated negotiation practices (Table 2 ). The final step in the methodology returns to a phenomenological identification of the responses of the author to each of the Chinese negotiation practices identified, as highlighted in analysis of the case experience. Examination of the responses within the context of the various stages of the negotiation along with discussion of the logical assumptions driving the responses provides the basis for discussion of underlying success factors for cross-cultural negotiation between Chinese and foreign representatives.
RESULTS

Culture and Negotiation in China
Current literature (Blackman, 1997; Woo & Prud'homme, 1999; Fang, 1999) suggests three critical factors exercising a strong emotional and practical impact on foreign businesspeople negotiating in China. The first is the method and manner in which the Chinese conduct the negotiations. Elements of the Chinese approach as reviewed are summarized in Table 1 , but the initial disconnection experienced by many foreign business negotiators is the seeming contradiction between the positive image and experience of Chinese culture encountered outside a business relationship and that which presents itself once commercial dealings are initiated. Research undertaken by Pye (1982 Pye ( , 1992 , Seligman (1999), and Blackman (1997) focuses on identifying "tactics and ploys" used by Chinese negotiators. Their findings, summarized in Table  1 , combined with additional observations (Kazuo, 1979; Mann, 1989; Stewart & Keown, 1989; Tung, 1989) , result in a documented reputation of Chinese negotiators as "inscrutable, skillful, tough, shrewd, and tenacious" (Fang, 1999, p. 46) .
The second major dilemma for foreign entrepreneurs is the influence of the surrounding sociopolitical and economic environment on all aspects of the negotiation. This factor encompasses historical elements, such as the traditional distrust that Chinese have of outsiders who have in the past negotiated arrangements to the detriment of their Chinese counterparts (Starr, 2001) . It also flows from the current level of bureaucratic complexity in China, which requires all significant decisions to be authorized by many levels of frequently competing interests at the personal, district, municipal, provincial, and national levels. Such duplications of function and conflict of inter-456 THE JOURNAL OF APPLIED BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE December 2003   TABLE 1 Chinese Business Negotiation Practices Pye (1982 ) Seligman (1999 ) Blackman (1997 (Pye, 1982; Blackman, 1987) . Don't show interest in others' service or product.
Let them make initial statements of position and concessions. 1.1 Gather information about Chinese needs before meeting.
1.2 Present many areas of potential collaboration, not only one.
1.3 Show limited concern about short-term dates and commitments.
2. Chinese negotiators should control the pace and use of time in negotiations (Pye, 1982; Fang, 1999; Tai, 1988 3. Past gains are the basis for future settlements (Blackman, 1997 (Blackman, , 2001 Bond, 1991 4. Friends help friends (Bond, 1991; Shenkar & Ronan, 1987) . Use old friend designation to secure concessions or peripheral advantage. 4.1 Use old friend status to request help with pricing and other structures.
5. Winning the negotiation is paramount-the creative use of information in support of this goal is acceptable (Blackman, 1997; Pye, 1982; Seligman, 1999 ). Refer to real or fictional regulations, policies, or budget limitations to get concessions. 5.1 Use third party to search out regulations for accurate information.
5.2 Use policies and regulations from your own company to counterbalance.
6. The superior makes decisions (Bond, 1991; Fang, 1999; Shenkar & Ronen, 1987) . Refer all significant decisions to highest ranking person or committee.
6.1 Plan frequent breaks in negotiation to allow consultation with superiors.
6.2 Use hierarchy of individuals or decision bodies on your side strategically.
7. Negotiations are never finished-agreements are the beginning of ongoing renegotiations (Fang, 1999; Herbig & Martin, 1998; Pye, 1982; Woo & Prud'homme, 1999 ). When negotiation is over, change some element of contract in favor of Chinese side. 7.1 Know your bottom line and don't budge from it.
Be willing to walk away from a "bad" contract.
est cause costly time delays in securing final negotiation settlements. They also can significantly increase the cost of the final agreement. The third area of complication in Blackman's experience is that of culture itself, including such areas as the meaning implied by individual behavior and the complications of language and cultural expectations. Shenkar and Ronen (1987, p. 266) , for example, note cultural difficulties between the United States and China in relation to perceptions of appropriate individual negotiating behavior generated by differences in beliefs related to such fundamental social constructs as the rule of law. Differences in behavioral expectations driven by such deeply held concepts represent significant impediments to easy negotiation between foreigners and Chinese negotiating counterparts. Another example of critical areas of difference and potential misunderstanding is the meanings (and expectations) associated with different levels of relationship within the Chinese context. For example, the title old friend can appear to be a charming interpersonal style of greeting, but it implies an expectation that the recipient will respond to requests for favors and special services that would not be expected of "new friends" (Shenkar & Ronen, 1987, p. 270 ). Old friends demonstrate loyalty and support, something that foreign businesspeople clearly do. Expectations on the Chinese side, however, may exceed the capacity of non-Chinese counterparts to respond within the context of a negotiation, in terms of both their own perceptions of appropriateness and organizationally accepted policies and practice (Seligman, 1999) .
The above three areas-the tactics of negotiation, the sociopolitical environment surrounding negotiations, and the differences in underlying cultural expectationsare highlighted in the literature in relation to negotiation in China in particular and cross-cultural negotiation processes more generally (Gulliver, 1979) . They serve as useful organizing frameworks for the analysis of operating realities affecting negotiation in China. This article focuses on the first of these: the strategies, tactics, and behavioral practices of negotiation in a Chinese context.
The intent of the article is to contribute to the literature related to Chinese negotiation practice by using a documented case study to describe a range of concrete behaviors associated with Chinese negotiation principles and practices. It proposes a variety of coping responses that have been used to respond effectively to Chinese negotiation practices. Application of the principles and responses identified here in cases other than the example documented in this article and extensive review of the literature have shown them to effectively model Chinese negotiation behavior across multiple Chinese organizational environments. These include State Owned Enterprises (SOE) (Pye, 1982 (Pye, , 1992 Child, 1994) , Joint Ventures (Roberts, 1997) , and fully owned private companies (Blackman, 1997 (Blackman, , 2001 ). This consistency of style across organizational contexts may result from the strength and pervasiveness of the cultural traditions from which Chinese negotiating strategy derives much of its substance-primarily a combination of its Confucian and Taoist roots (Deverge, 1986; Shenkar & Ronen, 1987; Seligman, 1999 )-although Child (1994 suggests the lack of a well-developed and socially respected legal framework supporting a more formalized negotiation regime also may be a contributing factor.
The Case-Negotiating a Human Resource Management (HRM) Training Contract
Prior to the negotiation described in this article, I had worked in China on six separate occasions, with expenses covered variously by my Chinese "hosting Unit," a joint venture operation linking Chinese SOEs with North American consulting firms. On each of the trips, I contacted various SOEs and ran short seminars at no cost as a strategy of building and maintaining my relationship with the State Coordinating Agency (SCA). I had decided in 1997 that I wanted to more actively promote my professional engagement in China and that my relationship at the SCA probably was a good place to start. With this motivation, I returned to China in the early summer of 1997 and set up a meeting with my primary contact at the SCA to discuss what opportunities there might be to pursue additional engagements in China.
Initiation of the HRM Seminar Negotiation
My initial call was to Madame Wang, the codirector of the SCA. I had a longstanding relationship, having known both of Madame Wang's predecessors and having hosted all directors of the agency in my home in Canada over a 10-year period. Through my contacts with the senior management trainees at one of the associated SOEs, I was aware that the SCA was planning a major management skills-training initiative, with focus on HRM (1.1 1 ). Through a request that I made for information about SCA programs, I discovered that they had fallen behind in the "soft" management training side (1.1). This led me to believe that an opportunity existed for me to put my services forward to help them deal with this gap in their program.
I contacted Madame Wang and indicated that I was in Beijing on another management training venture and would like to drop in to talk about business opportunities. She indicated a warm interest in meeting with an "old friend," and we set up an appointment. When I arrived, we discussed past involvements that we had had, and she inquired about the business opportunities that I had mentioned. I indicated that there were three issues that I wanted to discuss with her (1.2). The first was my willingness to run another informal (and free) half-day HRM seminar for a group of managers of her choosing (1.1). She indicated that she would like very much to have this happen and would get back to me with a date. The second issue was my general interest in running HRM seminars in cooperation with the SCA, though this was more of a long-term vision (1.3). The third issue was a desire on my part to build a relationship between the SCA and my university in Canada. We talked about all three briefly and ended the discussion with statements of intent to move forward on all three initiatives.
Second Meeting Concerning the HRM Seminar Negotiation
Two days after I delivered the half-day seminar, Madame Wang contacted me about the possibility of running an HRM seminar in the far western part of China. We were to meet at her office the next day. Prior to the meeting, I met with a Chinese colleague at a related SOE and questioned him about specific details of the target SOE operation, including human resources developments at this particular location. Through this meeting, I managed to develop a good overview of the situation at the enterprise (1.1).
At our meeting the next day, Madame Wang indicated that there was interest in having me deliver a seminar in Urumqi and listed a number of HRM topics for delivery. She requested that I develop an outline for such a course prior to my departure for Canada and submit this, along with costing requirements, for her review. Because I was scheduled to leave the next day, I was placed in a position of either trying to develop a potentially inappropriate seminar schedule including costing or having to find a way to delay. I told her that I would need to confer with my business partners to confirm my availability. I could guarantee her a completed proposal within a week of my arrival in Canada (2.3). When she pushed for an immediate submission, I indicated that I could not commit to any business contracts without consultation with my management team. I would have to meet with them first because this was our company's management policy (2.3). Madame Wang respected my declared "company policy" and agreed to this revised submission time frame for the proposal.
Upon return to Canada, I drew up an outline for the workshop along with a detailed listing of requirements related to budget. I faxed the proposal to Madame Wang. Then I waited. We had discussed a tentative delivery date in early December. When I had not heard anything by late September, I contacted a colleague and friend in Beijing who knew Madame Wang professionally and asked him if he could contact her for an update (2.2). This colleague had lived with me for 6 months in Canada during which we had developed a tight bond of personal and professional friendship.
My colleague contacted Madame Wang, indicating to her that I was concerned with the impending timing of the seminar. I asked him to indicate to her that even if the seminar was postponed, I would look forward to meeting with her informally in Beijing in December (2.1). Almost immediately, I received a fax from Madame Wang indicating that the seminar indeed had been postponed and that she would look forward to meeting with me. In a subsequent telephone conversation, my colleague indicated to me that through his discussion with Madame Wang, he had discovered that she had known about the postponement for more than a month but was reluctant to notify me due to the initial pressure she had put on me. He indicated that there were also "some budgeting issues" about which Madame Wang had been vague. I responded with warm thanks to Madame Wang and indicated that I looked forward to seeing her in December.
December Banquet Meeting-The "Professional Fees Dilemma"
Before contacting Madame Wang in December, I met with my colleague in Beijing and asked him about conversations that he had had with her (1.1; 2.2). I described my letter of proposal to Madame Wang, including the fees I had proposed. I outlined the number of times I had come to China for no fees and detailed the exact fees that I had been paid on the other occasions so that he would know the broader context of the negotiations (3.1). Most significantly, I indicated that I planned to continue to come to his Institute and deliver courses and do research at no cost for the foreseeable future on the basis of my commitment to the Institute. But with organizations like the SCA, I needed to charge professional fees to balance off the free work. I asked him, as an old friend, for his advice (4.1). He said that he would think things over and let me know (5.1).
I contacted Madame Wang the next morning. She invited me, my colleague, and two representatives from the International Bureau of the SOE in Urumqi to a banquet that evening. Toward the end of the meal, she opened the discussion of the seminar, indicating that the SCA was interested in having me deliver the seminar but that there was no budget available to cover professional fees. She and the representative indicated that they really appreciated the many seminars that I had done in the past and indicated that they were simply asking me, as an "old friend," to do one more for them.
I thanked them both for their outline of the proposal and indicated that I understood their budgeting dilemma. I then provided them a detailed outline of my involvement in China, describing the fees and expenses of each trip as I had to my colleague the evening before (3.1). I summarized by saying that my company had been involved in China for 7 years and had essentially broken even on the relationship. I then described the growing difficulty that I was experiencing with my company's "management committee" (2.3). I indicated that my associates were growing unhappy with the amount of time I was spending in China because it was not generating economic returns. I was under obligation to meet with them and discuss any changes to the proposal I had submitted, a meeting that, I indicated, would be very difficult if I did not have some "near foreign market value" professional fees to propose (2.3; 5.2; 6.2). I asked for their assistance in thinking through how we might structure an agreement, which would satisfy my colleagues and achieve the delivery of the seminar in Urumqi at the same time. I said that I was prepared to commit myself to deliver the seminar if we could together work out some solution to this problem, possibly considering the situation overnight. I suggested that both go away to think about possible solutions to the problem (6.1).
A Hasty Meeting, a Tentative Contract, Some Interesting Reversals, and a Final Deal
Early on the following morning, I received a call from Madame Wang. She informed me that she had met with her superior concerning the Urumqi seminar and that she wanted to discuss my possible involvement in the seminar once again. When she arrived, she began again to tell me about the budget problem and how sorry she felt that they could not offer me any professional fees. Madame Wang indicated that she had talked with her director and that he had suggested that if I would be willing to cover all expenses related to the seminar and give them the receipts, they could perhaps make a payment in the amount of approximately $10,000 Canadian for everything. We discussed what fees I would have to cover, and we agreed that I would be responsible for international airfare ($2000), transportation to Urumqi ($400), and food and accommodation ($50/day). In return, the SOE in Urumqi would pay me $10,000 in fees. I agreed to present this proposal to my "management committee" (6.2). When I arrived back in Canada, I faxed immediately, restating the agreed terms in writing, indicating that my colleagues had agreed to this proposal, and asking her to confirm by fax the exact dates of the seminar. I also asked that she confirm that the above outlined expenses were the maximum amounts that would be charged under this agreement (7.1).
Within a few days, I received a return fax indicating the dates for delivery of the seminar in May, a revised increased fee for the airfare to Urumqi (an additional $300), and a revised increased fee for accommodation at Urumqi (an additional $50/day). I faxed a return indicating that because we had discussed the amounts outlined in the first fax and I had presented these to my colleagues, these must remain the basis of our agreement. I indicated my ongoing commitment to continuing to build our relationship and indicated that perhaps the timing was just not right for our delivery of the seminar in Urumqi (7.1). Within 24 hours, I received a fax reply from Madame Wang indicating that she had discussed the situation with the director at Urumqi and that he had agreed to make up the difference. The workshop was on per our agreement!
DISCUSSION
Negotiating Principles and Practices in China and Potential Responses
Chinese negotiating processes can be viewed as structured into three stages of effort (Pye, 1982) . In the initial stage of a negotiation, the Chinese negotiator attempts to establish as much control over the process as possible before negotiations continue. The second stage of negotiations determines price and quantity of the services or goods in question. This would typically be the final stage in non-Chinese negotiation practices. There is a third stage, however, in which the Chinese negotiator attempts to insure that the most favorable deal has been struck for the Chinese. Throughout a negotiation, the Chinese negotiator typically views the process as a zero-sum game (Blackman, 1997; Fang, 1999) . Principles and practices associated with these stages, illustrated through reference to the negotiation experience above, are outlined briefly in Table 2 and discussed in more detail in the text that follows.
Initial Stage of Negotiation: Controlling the Process
Principle 1 Negotiating Practices
Chinese negotiators should control the others' Do not show interest in others' service or product. perceptions of interests and/or needs.
Let the other make all initial statements of position and concession.
The Chinese believe that to be in control of the process, it is best to let the other party drive the opening of the negotiation in terms of proposal of products or services. Pye (1982) observes that once negotiations begin, the Chinese become passive, allowing the other party to take the initiative in stating their position, an approach that seems to be part of a conscious negotiating ploy. This practice represents, in negotiating parlance, a "position-based" as opposed to "interest-based" strategy of negotiation (Fisher & Ury, 1980) . The Chinese desire is to have the foreigners state their position first and, in as much detail as possible, to reveal crucial expectations and constraints. Confucius suggests that circular discussions around significant issues, with gathering rather than giving information as a primary initial purpose, mitigates the risk associ-ated with decision making and relationship building (Fan, 1995) . Risk is perceived in the level of uncertainty and in the sense that non-Chinese are "outsiders" not to be trusted (Hofstede, 1991) . Many Chinese assume that foreigners are essentially "bad" in nature, based on the primacy of materialism in non-Chinese cultures (Kluckholn & Strodtbeck, 1961) . As a result, Chinese negotiators tend to approach situations of significant interaction, such as negotiation, with a mindset framed in caution (Ai & Abramson, 1995) .
Potential Responses to Chinese Passivity and Pressures for Initial Proposals
Collect information about the needs of the Chinese before initial meetings (1.1). In this way, you can present yourself and your product or service in ways immediately relevant to them, capturing their attention while highlighting, in an understated manner, your own knowledge of their current business drivers. Your presentation should focus on what you offer without bluntly stating the Chinese business needs, because they may perceive need as a potential weakness. Identifying need directly may lead to loss of face, both related to the need made explicit and potentially related to other related issues that the first may surface (Blackman, 1997) . A clear presentation will insure the connection is made. It is particularly effective to offer to demonstrate your capability to deliver appropriate services through small demonstration sessions or miniprograms. Delivered at no cost to the Chinese partner, these demonstrate your commitment to the relationship as well. In my case, I had relationships with several related SOEs and so was aware of the current organizational imperative for the SCA to deliver HRM training. I also had demonstrated over time the quality and relevance of my training programs by delivering pro bono sessions whenever I worked in Beijing.
Present a number of options for collaboration (1.2).
Be sure to include the one in which you know they have particular interest. The wider the spectrum of interests and capabilities you demonstrate, the more difficult it becomes to target one in particular as the key negotiating area, because the Chinese side will not know which of the areas mentioned is your primary interest. This is a particularly effective response if you indeed are interested in a number of different project possibilities and can maintain a long-term focus on which one comes through first. In my own case, I was sincerely interested in pursuing three interrelated agendas, all of which could be viewed as mutually advantageous to both the Chinese organizations and my own interests. Although my primary interest on this visit was to negotiate an agreement to deliver HRM training, this was not obvious in my initial presentation of my interests or in our subsequent initial discussion. True to Principle 1, Madame Wang did not reveal her interest in having me deliver an HRM seminar and indicated warm interest in all three agendas. She left me unclear as to her primary interest in the immediate delivery of management training sessions.
Be prepared to demonstrate lack of concern over specific deadlines or dates of delivery (1.3). This implies not that you indicate a lack of interest in negotiating a contract but rather that you frame your interests as long term rather than immediate. The further away you can project delivery of a product or service, the better, in that the Chinese side will believe that you are not desperate for the deal to proceed, putting them at a perceived disadvantage if they know you are capable of delivering a service that they know they need. The approach also implies that you have other sources of revenue, suggesting that while you are interested, you are not desperate. In the case of Madame Wang's training, our initial discussion focused on the potential for collaborating on future projects with a focus on the development of long-term relationships between our relative institutions. No mention was made of impending seminars, and no push was made by either side to speculate on dates for initial delivery of services or seminars. The meeting was formative and the grounds had been built to proceed to more detailed discussions.
Principle 2 Negotiating Practices
Control the pace and use of time.
Use time strategically. Delay responses to proposals until the last minute. Make demands for concessions or changes in contract at the last minute.
In the English language, there are 30 tenses for each verb, a testament to how important time is viewed in our culture. In Chinese, verbs themselves are not conjugated. Tenses can be ascribed by adding additional words to the verb, but the verb form is not changed, reflecting a deep-rooted cultural belief that time is not "of the essence" in important interactions. At the same time, the Chinese are well aware of the importance of time in Western cultures, where "time is money," and they use it effectively as a negotiating tool.
The foreign negotiator can expect the Chinese to use this tool in a number of ways. First, they may delay making commitments. They know that foreigners have traveled great distances at some expense to negotiate the contract, and delays are costly. Foreigners often make concessions in the face of delay to secure a signed agreement (Pye, 1982) . Alternately, the Chinese negotiator may claim their own time constraints are forcing them to push for an agreement. Their claim may of course be genuine, when they face pressure from superiors to conclude an arrangement. However, such practices typically are tactical in nature, used with the intent of building pressure for quick agreement to terms favorable to the Chinese (Fang, 1999) .
Potential Responses to Control Over Exigencies of Time
Do not count on signing a contract on any particular trip (2.1).
Make it clear to your Chinese colleagues (and to those back home who may bring pressure for the completed agreement) that although you are willing to complete an agreement, it is not the primary purpose of your visit (Ai & Abramson, 1995) . Declare the purpose of the visit to be "fruitful discussions" leading to the signing of a contract, but indicate at the beginning that you will be quite willing to return home without a signed contract because you trust that in the long term, there will be a successful negotiation between the two parties. Assuming that you have gathered sufficient information about the real needs of the Chinese, the pressure is now transferred back to the Chinese negotiating team to bring closure to the negotiations if this is their intent. My trip to China was not tied specifically to the negotiations with Madame Wang, so it was plausible that I would be unable to sign any agreement that was unfavorable for my company without "consultations" with the other members of the firm's management team. I clearly was not under any pressure to complete an agreement, a condition that I suspected and later confirmed was not true for my counterpart.
Use a trusted middle person to clear up misunderstandings and gather data (2.2).
Chinese use of intermediaries is both respected and understood as a preferred practice for clearing up misunderstandings or, better yet, passing or acquiring valuable information useful to move the negotiation forward quickly (Pye, 1982; Seligman, 1999) . My relationship with a trusted colleague was sufficiently deep and long-standing that he was able and willing to act as an effective go-between for purposes of the negotiation. He was able to play this role without prejudice to his "Chinese commitments," because I clearly had committed myself to a long-term relationship both to China and to his institute. This degree of proven commitment was significant both to him, as a friend, and to his institute because both had benefited through association with me as a professional and with my university in Canada.
Delay commitments through reference to institutional regulations and requirements for superior review (2.3).
In the situation where the Chinese bring pressure on a negotiator to quickly agree to unsatisfactory conditions, the negotiator can use the same stratagems as his or her Chinese counterpart for delaying the decision. The requirement to refer decisions to superiors or to a governing body is easily understood by Chinese negotiators who generally must deal with the same reality in keeping with their own hierarchical and risk-averse decision structures (Fang, 1999) . Foreign negotiators might legitimately indicate that decisions of a particular size or significance require review of the final proposal by other parties. They also might indicate that the agreement must be in a final form acceptable to their company, a requirement necessitating a short break (perhaps overnight) to configure documentation. This provides space for reflection for both sides while keeping the negotiation open. My insistence that I had to pass the decision by my "management team" in Canada, though not fully accurate, proved to be a reasonable and useful response in this situation because it fit with Chinese experience and provided me with valuable time to consider an appropriate response to Madame Wang's proposals.
Second Stage of Negotiation: Establishment of Pricing and Conditions
Principle 3 Negotiating Practices
Past gains are the basis of future negotiations. Use past preferential contract amounts or delivery conditions as basis for current negotiations.
Price determination often is difficult due to Chinese government regulations. At the same time, price represents one of the most concrete metrics against which "winning and losing" can most easily be measured (Pye, 1982) and, as such, is particularly important to the Chinese negotiator because of the imperative to save face (Seligman, 1999) . Decision making is driven by both the usual imperative to drive a good bargain and the desire to protect past gains (Child, 1994; Ai & Abramson, 1995) . Past business agreements are used as a benchmark on price limits. The Chinese negotiator prefers to take the past price as a maximum in the current negotiation because a higher price raises questions about their personal competence and loyalty to the organization (Bond, 1986) . Chinese negotiators typically will demand conditions equal or better to those established in the past for current contracts. This can make negotiations difficult when initial contracts were taken as "loss leaders" to establish relationships or to enter a market. Chinese negotiators encourage this practice, arguing in favor of future potential opportunities (Blackman, 2001 ). However, they also will subsequently consider the initial price as a measure of the baseline for future negotiations, making it difficult to negotiate the price upward at a later date (Fang, 1999) . Generally, Chinese approach situations in the present with a mindset focused on past and current advantages (Bond, 1991) .
Potential Responses to Pressures Based on Prior Negotiated Settlements
Be prepared to demonstrate that your company has foregone revenue in China over time and that this is not fair or sustainable in the long run (3.1).
Your business case should provide precise details of the overall balance sheet to date of your involvement in China. A written record is not necessary, but it must be presented in a thoughtful and detailed manner, indicating exact costs of services provided and exact amounts of payments the Chinese side has made in the past. Indicate that your company has, in good faith, foregone profit or absorbed losses to demonstrate loyalty and sincerity to the Chinese partner. Let them know that questions about fairness are being raised by your bosses and that you are under pressure to charge reasonable market prices, or your company may have to reduce their commitment to China. Then invite them to help you find a way to resolve the situation. My own lengthy relationship with the SCA and the willingness I had demonstrated from the beginning to provide services at minimal or no cost established my personal credibility and a business legitimacy to my demand for payment. My history of involvement with and service to the SCA made it difficult for my Chinese counterpart to continue to demand free services. Such an approach represents a direct appeal to the Taoist principle of balance (Fang, 1999) and the Confucian principle of "right relationship between friends" (Tung, 1994) .
Principle 4 Negotiating Practices
Friends help friends. Use the concept of relationship and old friend to secure additional concessions or peripheral advantage. Imply membership of the negotiator in a circle of special relationship and demand concessions based on such membership.
Relationship is classified across a number of levels defining expectations and responsibilities between parties in Chinese society (Miles, 1997) . These levels of rela-tionship, especially new friend and old friend are central to negotiations. References to old friend imply expectations of concessions and special consideration on both sides. These implications are taken seriously, and one can expect the Chinese to use them to their advantage in negotiations, although there is little evidence that such concessions actually are made by the Chinese themselves in relation to foreigners (Ai & Abramson, 1995) . The principle "friends help friends" can therefore prove both costly to follow and difficult to ignore in the negotiation process.
Potential Responses to Pressures Based on Implied Special Relationships
Use reference to old friend status to request help with pricing and other structures (4.1). As part of your presentation dealing with pricing problems, declare your status as one of old friend. Indicate that relationships of friendship in your country mandate responsibilities on both sides to help each other in times of need. Indicate that as an old friend (based on past involvement and business agreements), you have demonstrated a willingness to offer special opportunities to your Chinese friends in the past. Then follow up with the assertion that you, an old friend, now require assistance and consideration from them. Describe the pressure to sell at reasonable profit margins and indicate a need to put together an agreement that will be seen favorably by your superiors. Where it is difficult for the Chinese side to move significantly on price, the Chinese often have much more flexibility around other factors such as quality standards, delivery dates, transportation, and payment structure. Special considerations around such elements of the negotiation may make lower selling prices more financially viable. In my HRM contract negotiation, I was able with some degree of legitimacy to indicate the difficulties I would face from my organization if I were to attempt to deliver the seminar on a pro bono basis. I appealed to them as "old friends" to help me develop an approach to convince my partners that our continued involvement in China was financially viable. Encouraged to think with the mindset of an old friend, my counterpart was pressured to reconsider her initial stance and to "do what was right" within this level of relationship.
Principle 5 Negotiating Practices
Winning the negotiation is paramount-the Refer to real or fictional regulations, policies or creative use of information in support of this budget limitations to get concessions. goal is acceptable. Blackman (1997) describes the Chinese use of fictitious or secret internal "regulations" as a sign of stonewalling typifying societies where distinctions are made between insiders (who will know what is real) and outsiders (who will not). Fang (1999) frames this behavior within the context of Sun Tzu's 36 stratagems guiding traditional strategic thinking in China. The literature provides broad-based support for the observation that such tactical behavior is culturally and socially acceptable in the practice of Chinese negotiation (Chen, 1993; Chu, 1991; Tung, 1994) .
Chinese negotiators depend on the foreigner's ignorance of the Chinese bureaucratic system to make claims of municipal regulations or government policies to their advantage. Indeed, the laws are relatively new and evolving (Fang, 1999) , and because there are generally many jurisdictions affected by significant decisions, regulations that exist (or may exist) are complex and multiple.
Potential Responses to Pressures Based on Arbitrary Regulations or Processes
Use a third party to investigate regulations for accurate assessment and use policies and regulations from your own company to counterbalance rules-based approaches (5.1). It is important to be prepared to commit time and effort to investigate the exact degree of existing regulations. This must be undertaken by a local Chinese colleague skilled in both the language and the politics of the organizations involved. In most cases, even a cursory examination highlights options that negate the effects of apparently immutable regulations and facilitates the furthering of negotiations (Ai & Abramson, 1995) .
Assert policies and regulations of your own company to counterbalance Chinese pressure to negotiate quickly (5.2).
The net effect of counterbalancing regulations, policies, or "management committee processes" can imply that it is difficult or impossible for the foreign negotiator to negotiate special arrangements in the moment. Use of such declared policies may make it possible to shift the discussion to other areas where negotiation is possible without damaging the relationship between the negotiators. Asserted regulations should be real or reasonable and should be presented as unfortunate facts of life around which the negotiator has no leeway. With Madame Wang, I used reference to the need for my "management committee" to review any changes to our proposal to postpone having to make a decision unfavorable to our position. The delay gave me some time to gather additional information and think about alternatives.
Principle 6 Negotiating Practices
The superior makes the decisions. Refer all significant decisions to the highest ranking person or committee.
China is a highly structured society, based on Confucian principles prescribing adherence to hierarchical decision-making processes. The majority of Chinese tend to be risk averse, preferring to keep their heads down. The department director can make decisions but typically takes great care to remain insulated against future difficulty or dispute. Very few Chinese managers are prepared to bypass the hierarchy (Blackman, 1997) . They try to avoid responsibility, diffuse decisions, and blunt all commands that later might leave one vulnerable to criticism (Pye, 1982) . With this need in mind, it should be expected that as negotiations progress, Chinese negotiators will be required to confer with their superiors. In China, the need for consultation and direction from superiors demands frequent breaks (Seligman, 1999) or changes in negotiators (Ai & Abramson, 1995) so that input from superiors is maintained. This causes some stress for the foreigners who typically operate on the assumption that time is money and frequently interpret the Chinese breaks as signs of confusion or insincerity.
Potential Responses to the Need for Consultation With Absent Superiors
Plan the negotiation to include frequent significant breaks (6.1). Such a strategy will provide you with opportunities for rest from the arduous process of negotiation and your Chinese counterparts with opportunities for communication with superiors. You can also use the time to build the relationship outside the formal negotiation setting (Ai & Abramson, 1995) . Time spent cultivating personal knowledge of each other will serve the negotiation much more powerfully than a day at the negotiation table. I had other commitments during my trip to Beijing, so it was convenient for me to allow intervals during which Madame Wang could confer with her supervisors at SCA to establish the availability of the funding that I was requesting. Without such breaks, her own freedom of decision making would have been severely curtailed, limiting our ability to resolve the funding issues in the negotiation.
Use hierarchy of individuals or decision bodies on your side strategically (6.2).
Although foreigners frequently have more latitude for decision making, the strategy of insisting on the need to submit proposals and agreements to superiors for confirmation fits well with a system of negotiation easily understood by the Chinese. Blackman (2001) indicates that such delays and strategic references to the necessity for senior managers to reflect on specific decisions can serve to heighten the perceived significance of those individual decisions. She also indicates that the judicious use of hierarchy in this way can serve to build momentum in the process because the Chinese side perceives the increased involvement of senior decision makers as a sign that key decision points are being approached. In the case of my own negotiation, the declared need to put the pricing of the contract into the picture of our company's overall considerations of the financial viability of doing work in China indicated that our firm was reaching a potential crossroad about further involvement. The use of hierarchy as a review of this significant decision to signal this message was easily read by the Chinese negotiators.
Third Stage of Negotiations: Finding Special Advantage for the Chinese Side
Principle 7 Negotiating Practices
Negotiations are never finished-agreements When the negotiation is over, change some element of are the beginning of ongoing negotiations.
the contract in favor of the Chinese side.
Once the agreement is signed, foreigners frequently find that there are changes made to what has been agreed, often without discussion or warning. A document is presented that ostensibly is the contract discussed but in fact represents a changed agreement. Li (1988) cautions Chinese negotiators to examine contracts carefully to prevent themselves from "falling into the trap that the opposition has smartly set." In some cases, there can be significant changes in the pricing, delivery conditions, and even the specifications of the product to be delivered.
Potential Responses for Dealing With Changes in the Contract
Realize that contract signing for the Chinese is simply a signpost on the road to building an ongoing relationship-The negotiation has just begun (7.1). Contracts in China are fluid, not the end of negotiations. The foreign negotiator must keep sight of their bottom line on core issues of the contract (such as price, delivery schedule, and volume) and be prepared to refuse to budge beyond that bottom line. This "forcing strategy" must carry the unspoken conviction that it is better to walk away from the business than to carry it out under unfavorable terms (Ai & Abramson, 1995; Fang, 1999) . Such strategies can cost the negotiator an initial or single contract, but if carried out in a manner reinforcing the foreigner's commitment to the relationship, such a stance can result in a reputation of tenacity and persistence for the foreign negotiator that is valued by the Chinese.
In my negotiation for this case's successful contract, there were two instances of the use of this tactic: my own initial refusal to draw up a schedule and budget plan without returning to Canada and my response to the changes in the internal airfare and accommodation costs at Urumqi. In both instances, the Chinese side responded favorably to the tactic and brought the original agreement back to the table. I believe that their willingness to do this was more a factor of the length of our relationship than any particular adroitness on my part. Although clearly a viable response to contract changes, this "willing to walk" strategy should be used with extreme caution and carefully prepared in advance so its use does not damage potential long-term relationships (Ai & Abramson, 1995) .
CONCLUSION
Cross-cultural research focused on negotiation has clearly and conclusively demonstrated that assumptions and behaviors differ in fundamental ways across cultural boundaries. In negotiations between Chinese and foreign actors, both sides can experience their values being challenged and, on bad days, their sense of competence shaken. In negotiations in China, both sides make the erroneous assumption that the goals of the other party are transparent and known. The Chinese assume that the foreigners are there for short-term profit, whereas the foreigners assume that the Chinese are interested in nothing but price. This often results in what Blackman (1997) has termed the "culture of bazaar haggling" that tends to dominate most negotiations in China. This article has proposed strategies for the foreign negotiator to address seven Chinese principles and related practices, using a real negotiation as illustration. My experience has been that negotiations generally proceed successfully in China when the intent is not to cheat or trick the Chinese side into an agreement. If the intent is to resolve differences in ways that make it possible for the Chinese partners to meet their own as well as the long-term needs of the foreign side, quality agreements are possible.
An early Chinese mentor, Mr. Zhang Xin, once advised that to be successful in China, an individual should banquet frequently and speak frankly. When we banquet, we do not banquet for the food but for the occasion to talk in a relaxed setting about who we really are. In fact, we banquet to build relationships. And, through relationships, we can do much business. We speak frankly so that people can come to know us as people who will tell them, quietly and with appropriate politeness, both good news and bad and then be around in the long term to help with whatever develops. In China in 1993, government officials spent more than 100 billion yuan on food and drink, more than the central government spent on health, education, and welfare combined (Blackman, 1997) . It would appear the Zhang Xin is not alone in his support of banquets and the relationship building they forge.
The Chinese negotiator struggles with images of effective negotiation just as we do from our own cultural perspectives. Negotiating in China can be carried out extremely effectively if we as foreigners take the time to come to commit ourselves to building and maintaining the relationships that will ultimately be the core factor that ensures success in negotiating in China.
NOTE
1. References are to the numbered suggested responses for the negotiator that are associated with individual Chinese negotiation principles and practices as outlined in Table 2 .
